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CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO
By J. DAVID PENWELL*
In recent years there has been a heightened interest in the field
of civil rights. The impact has been especially significant on the
legal profession, nevertheless, many lawyers have limited working
knowledge in this important field in that they are unfamiliar with
the practices and procedures of the civil rights commissions and are
unaware of the full ramifications of current civil rights legislation.
In this timely and well documented article, Mr. Penwell examines
civil rights law in Colorado. He discusses the development as well
as the present state of Colorado law relating to the Public Accom-
modations Act, the Fair Employment Act, and the Fair Housing
Act. He also compares Colorado law with federal civil ri hts law
and with that of other states. Furthermore, he explains how the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission administers the law and the
procedures established by the commission for handling a civil rights
case. Finally, Mr. Penwell notes the shortcomings of the existing
civil rights laws and gives suggestions for their improvement.
INTRODUCTION
C OLORADO has had a long, if perhaps sometimes undis-
tinguished, history in civil rights. It is only in the last 10 years
or so, however, that there has been any legal significance attached
to this subject. It is presently receiving a great deal of attention and
the purpose of this article is to explain the civil rights laws presently
existing in Colorado.
Except for the larger employers, few clients of an attorney will
have had much experience or contact with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, the agency administering the state's civil rights laws.
For this reason the number of lawyers who are familiar with the
commission and its statutes is relatively small. However, the pro-
fessional tools needed for civil rights cases are neither involved
nor difficult, and it is hoped that the information contained in this
article will save the attorney a certain amount of time in appraising
and understanding a civil rights case if he should receive one.
Colorado presently has three civil rights statutes: a public ac-
commodations act,' a fair employment act,2 and a fair housing act.'
As with most regulatory and enforcement statutes, there are other
*Assistant Secretary and Counsel for the Golden Cycle Corporation, Colorado Springs,
Colorado. B.S. University of Montana, 1955; L.L.B. University of Colorado, 1962.
Former Assistant Attorney General, State of Colorado and Legal Counsel - Colorado
Civil Rights Commission.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-1 etseq. (1963).
2 Id. §§ 80-21-1 et seq.
3 Id. §§ 69-7-1 ei seq., as amended (Supp. 1965).
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limitations, prohibitions, and restrictions relating to civil rights
to be found in other laws. With one exception,4 however, these
other laws exist and operate outside of the statutory jurisdiction
of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. This article will be
limited, therefore, to a consideration of the three major laws ad-
ministered by the commission and the procedures followed in
carrying out its duties.
I. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
Early in Colorado's history a civil rights policy was built into
the structure of the law. The Enabling Act laying the foundation
for the adoption of a constitution, the creation of a state, and its
admission to the Union provided that "the constitution should be
republican in form, and shall make no distinction in civil or political
rights on account of race or color ... [and] that perfect toleration
of religious sentiment shall be secured and no inhabitant of said
state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of
his or her mode of religious worship ..."' These requirements were
later incorporated in various forms into the Colorado Constitution.6
In 1885, only five years after the adoption of the constitution,
the general assembly passed its first civil rights law - a public
accommodations act.7 This law remained unchanged until 1895
when the initial act was repealed and reenacted in its present form.'
The 1895 law was substantially the same as the one it replaced,
except that the later statute deleted churches as places of public
accommodation. To the possibility of incurring a fine of $300.00
upon being convicted for a misdemeanor,9 the 1895 law also added
4 The Proprietary School Act of 1966, id. § 146-3-5(1) (Supp. 1967), gives the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission authority to investigate discriminatory practices
in proprietary schools and report the same to the State Board for Community Colleges
and Occupational Education. Most of the other civil rights laws involve a general
prohibition against discrimination (e.g., "There shall be no discrimination shown
toward any teacher in the assignment or transfer of that teacher to a school, position,
or grade because of sex, race, creed, color, or membership or nonmembership in any
group or organization." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-18-14(1). But such laws do
not provide for any penalties or enforcement measures in the event of a violation and
are, therefore, in practical effect merely statements of policy.
Other such laws not pertaining to matters under the commission's jurisdiction
(such as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-11-61 (1963) -discrimination in discharg-
ing an employee because of his age) declare that a violation constitutes a mis-
demeanor, but offer no affirmative relief to the aggrieved person. Even if a complaint
is filed under the statute, it is never prosecuted because of the different and heavier
burden of proof for a criminal case.
5 Colo. Enabling Act §4, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. Vol. 1 (1963).
6 COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-28 (the Bill of Rights), with specific reference to Section
4 on religious freedom and Section 25 on due process; see also Article IX, Section
8, prohibiting discrimination in public education.
7 Colo. Sess. Laws of 1885, at 132.
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a private remedy. An aggrieved person could file a private civil
action, with damages of up to $500.00 for each offense.10 The
complainant was required to elect his remedies, and could not pursue
more than one cause of action."
As with many Colorado statutes, this law was taken from an
Illinois law,' 2 which, in this case, had been copied from the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1875.13 The federal law was in substantially
the same form as that subsequently adopted in Colorado and pro-
hibited discrimination in the denial of the "full and equal enjoyment
of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of the
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places
of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude."' 4 Colo-
rado's law reads exactly the same except that it also includes
restaurants, eating houses, and barber shops and ends with "all"
other places of public accommodation.15
Various states passed such laws in response to the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Civil Rights Cases. 6 This
decision, consolidating several lower court decisions on the same
subject, held that the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 was uncon-
stitutional. The Court held that Congress was legislating in areas
reserved for state action by the 13th and 14th amendments to the
United States Constitution. The effect of these state laws was, for the
most part, annulled by the 1896 decision of the Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson," which articulated the "separate but equal"
doctrine. With the end of the Reconstruction Period, resulting from
the election of President Hayes in 1877, and the Plessy decision,
civil rights was retired as a legal concept for many years to come.
By 1964, 30 states in addition to Colorado had public accom-
modation laws, most of which are similar to Colorado's statute and
most of which were passed in the period between 1880 and 1900.18
Of these 30, 13 have been considered by their respective state supreme
courts and have been held to be constitutional. 9 In Colorado the
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 COTHRON'S ANN. STATUTES, Il. 449 (1887).
13 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
14 id. § 1.
15 
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-1 (1963).
16 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 284 (Appendix V) (1964).
19 Annot., 49 A.L.R. 505 (1927) ; see also School Committee of Boston v. Board of
Educ., 352 'Mass 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967).
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basic statute has been before the state supreme court six times. °
Four of these decisions were decided on procedural grounds, 21 but
in Crosswaith v. Bergin, the court specifically found the law to be
constitutional .
22
The case of Darius v. Apostolos 23 is particularly significant.
The issue was whether a bootblack stand was a place of public
accommodation since it was not specifically mentioned in the statute.
The court reversed the trial judge's decision and held that a boot-
black stand was included and was covered by the act. The court
ruled that the principle of ejusdem generis did not apply in the
interpretation of this statute and that the phrase "all other places of
public accommodation" was not limited to other places similar or
related to those places or establishments specifically mentioned earlier
in the statute, i.e., inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops,
public conveyances, and theaters, and that the phrase "all other
places" means exactly what it says.24 It was on the strength of this
case and Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution that the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission in 1967 issued a policy statement
that public schools are places of public accommodation in Colorado
and that the commission would therefore assume jurisdiction over
cases of de facto segregation in Colorado public schools.
25
When the legislature passed the Anti-Discrimination Act of
1957,26 Colorado's civil rights employment law, the public accom-
modations law was amended to bring the enforcement of public
accommodations discrimination under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Rights Commission,27 providing a third remedy to an aggrieved person
in addition to the civil action and misdemeanor prosecution already
available. The law also continued the requirement that a complainant
elect his remedies so that a choice of any one procedure would be
2
0Jemigan v. Lakeside Park Co., 136 Colo. 141, 314 P.2d 693 (1957); Johnson v.
Westland Theatres, Inc., 117 Colo. 346, 187 P.2d 932 (1947) ; Lueras v. Town of
Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 65 P.2d 1431 (1937) ; State ex rel. McKinney v. Lowry,
100 Colo. 144, 66 P.2d 334 (1937); Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d
848 (1934); Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1920).
21Jernigan v. Lakeside Park Co., 136 Colo. 141, 314 P.2d 693 '(1957); Johnson v.
Westland Theatres, Inc., 117 Colo. 346, 187 P.2d 932 (1947) ; Lueras v. Town of
Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 65 P.2d 1431 (1937); State ex rel. McKinney v. Lowry,
100 Colo. 144, 66 P.2d 334 (1937).
2295 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934), wherein the court cited Darius v. Apostolos, 68
Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 '(1920) for the proposition that the statute had been held
constitutional; however this issue was not discussed in the Darius case.
23 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1920).
24Id. at 327, 190 P. at 511.
2 Policy Statement, Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Minutes of Commission Meet-
ing, Dec. 22, 1967.
SCOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-1 el seq. (1963).
27id. §§ 25-3-3, 80-21-5 (1963). The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission
referred to in this statute has been redesignated the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion. COMO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-3, 80-21-5 (Supp. 1965).
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a bar to any alternate action.2" Under this amendment, the only relief
the commission can grant is to issue cease and desist orders prohibiting
further discriminatory conduct. If such an order were not obeyed, it
would be enforceable in the district court through the district court's
contempt powers.2" As with other laws administered by the com-
mission, such an administrative order can only be issued after an
administrative hearing in which the complainant has proved a
statutory violation,3" unless the case was disposed of before a hearing
through the conciliation powers of the commission to settle cases by
agreement of the parties.31
The most unique portion of the amended public accommodations
law is in the prohibition section setting forth the conduct forbidden.
No reference is made to the familiar words "race, creed, color, na-
tional origin or ancestry;" the law instead refers to: "All persons
.. shall be entitled to the. . equal use of places of public accomo-
dation." ' This would appear to be an admonition against any type
of deferential conduct by a proprietor. The statute ends this par-
ticular provision with the phrase, "Subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens." '
For example, apparently the owner of a bar could, under this law,
refuse to serve all drunks or those who appeared intoxicated or who
were causing a disturbance; but he could not be selective and only
throw out those against whom he had a particular aversion. If there
is a policy therefore, it must be applied equally to all.
Under this provision, therefore, the posting of the signs fre-
quently seen in places of public accommodation stating that "we
reserve the right to refuse service to anyone" is highly questionable
and probably unlawful. If a proprietor attempted to exercise this
privilege he might find it necessary to show that he does so under
the "conditions and limitations established by law and applicable
alike to all citizens. '3 4 If the aggrieved person could submit any
evidence showing that the proprietor's standards for such action
did not meet the statutory test and were in any way arbitrary, and
this evidence could not be rebutted by the proprietor, the complainant
would be able to prove a statutory violation.
'8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-1 (1963).
9 Id. §§ 25-3-5, 80-21-8.
30Id. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7.
31 Id. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7(3). The conciliation procedure is reviewed infra in this article.
3 2 Id. § 25-1-1 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 Id. In this regard, the commission has promulgated General Regulation No. 4 which
states that: "No person shall post, or permit to be posted in any place of public
accommodation any sign which states or implies the following: 'We reserve the
right to refuse service to anyone.'" LAws, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE COLO-
RADO CIVIL RIGHTS CoMMissioN 36 (1968).
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This law is a classic example of the uselessness of providing
a criminal penalty for a civil rights violation. The author has not
been able to find a single example of this law being enforced by
a prosecutor in the 93 years of its existence. A district attorney just
will not prosecute this kind of case for the very good reason that
the burden of proving his case beyond a reasonable doubt is practically
insurmountable.3 5 The commission appreciates how difficult such
prosecution would be from its own experience in hearing cases and
from trying to determine if the complainant has proven his case
under the easier test of proving a discriminatory act by a prepon-
derence of the evidence.
Since 1957, when the commission was given the authority to
administer this law, few private civil actions have been initiated, as
most of the cases that do arise are filed with the commission. For-
tunately, most respondents do not wish to engage in what could
be a lengthy and costly proceeding and most public accommodations
cases are conciliated amicably. This is really the best solution for
all concerned, for even if the commission is finally forced to hold
a hearing, the most it has the authority to do is issue a cease and
desist order. Therefore, it is suggested that if a respondent refused
to conciliate and the matter was taken to a hearing and the finding
was against the respondent, the commission should have the authority
to assess damages against the respondent for the complainant, espe-
cially since, as the law now reads, the complainant has given up
any form of monetary relief in initially filing his case with the
commission.36
II. FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
Colorado's civil rights law relating to employment is the Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1957. a  A 1965 amendment to this statute
created the Civil Rights Commission as it is presently constituted.
3 8
As with most civil rights employment laws of other states, Colorado's
law was copied from a 1945 New York statute,3 which was the first
to adopt a commission approach to the administration and enforce-
ment of civil rights.4°
The structure of the New York commission and statute has
since been more or less adopted by the other states who have legis-
35 See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 19-20 (1966).
Mr. Sovern touches on the nature of such laws, and comes to a similar conclusion.
36 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-1 (Supp. 1965).
37Id. §§ 80-21-1 et seq. (1963).
38 Id. §§ 80-21-2 el seq. (Supp. 1965).
39 N.Y. Sess. Laws of 1945, ch. 118, §§ 1-3.
40 SOVERN, supra note 35, at 19.
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lated in this area. 41 At the present time only 13 states do not have
fair employment laws.42 Except for two curious exceptions, North
and South Dakota, all of these states are from what might be con-
sidered the Deep South. Of the 37 states having fair employment
laws- together with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico -
33 administer and enforce the laws through commissions, boards,
or departments similar to the Colorado commission. 43 The remaining
states merely have statutory prohibitions against discrimination in
employment, with either no provision for a remedy or with only
the provision that such discrimination be treated as a misdemeanor,44
considered to be of little or no value.
Colorado's law covers all employers in the State of Colorado
and includes state agencies as well as all of Colorado's political
subdivisions.45 It also includes labor unions and employment
agencies.46 The law prohibits discrimination because of a person's







e. matters of compensation47




d. complying with a discriminatory request from an
employer48
(3) Labor unions in;
a. excluding from membership,
b. expulsion from membership,
c. denial of work opportunity.49
In addition, it is unlawful for an employer to place an advertisement
for employees which is discriminatory in its specifications. ° An
41 Id. See also Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527 (1961).
426 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:26-27 (1968).
431d.
441d.
45 COMO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-2(5)(Supp. 1969), 80-21-6(1-2) (1963).
"Id. §§ 80-21-2(3-4) (1963), 80-21-6(1-4) (Supp. 1969).
47
1d. §§ 80-21-6(1-2) (1969).
48Id. §§ 80-21-6(1-3).
-Id. §§ 80-21-6(1, 4).
501d. §§ 80-21-6(1, 5).
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additional paragraph covers persons who aid, abet, incite, compel,
or coerce others into discriminating, or who obstruct or prevent
others from complying with the law." In 1963, the Colorado law
was amended to cover discrimination in apprenticeship, on-the-job
training, or other vocational training or instruction programs. 2
Since 1963, sex discrimination has become an important issue
under federal law. The first major piece of modern civil rights
legislation by the United States Congress was the 1964 Civil Rights
Act;5" and one of the more important provisions in that law was
Title VII,54 the fair employment section, which included a pro-
scription against sex discrimination as well as the usual categories
of race, religion, color, and national origin.
In 1957, the first year of the Colorado commission's operation,
Mr. Marion Green, a Negro, filed a complaint charging Continental
Air Lines with discrimination for failing to hire him as a pilot.5"
In 1957, the issue of whether a Negro could become an airline pilot
was revolutionary in concept and the case was bitterly contested
by Continental. Today, while it probably would be incorrect to say
that discrimination does not exist in the airline industry, the question
of whether a Negro could become a pilot is not out of the ordinary
and is no longer the subject of tiresome racial jokes. Perhaps fair
employment laws are effective, not only in eliminating discrimination
in specific cases, but in changing the patterns and prejudices of our
society.
The commission found that Mr. Green had been discriminated
against and the decision was appealed to the Denver District Court,
the Colorado Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court.56
At every level of state court proceedings, the commission's finding of
discrimination against the airline was held to be outside the scope of
the jurisdiction of the state agency. The state courts held that Colo-
rado had been pre-empted from legislation in the field of interstate
commerce. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and ruled
that Colorado did indeed have jurisdiction in this area and that the
commission could regulate the hiring practices of interstate carriers
within the state. 57 Civil rights in employment was thereby included
as an area of concurrent jurisdiction between the states and the
Federal Government.
51Id. §§ 80-21-6(1, 6).
52 d. §§ 80-21-6(t, 7).
5342 U.S.C. §§ 1975(a-d), 2000(a-h) (1964).
H4d. §§ 20ooe-2000e(15) (1964).
5 See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 149 Colo.
259, 368 P.2d 970 (1962), a/f'd 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
5a Id.
57 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714
(1963).
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Lawyers anguish or delight in fine legal points, but they tend
to forget how the man in the street is affected by the evolution of
the law. It is interesting how many persons, including nonminority
group members, know of the Green decision and that Mr. Green
finally got his job, as he was thereafter hired by Continental pursuant
to the commission's original order. This case, as much as any other,
served to "establish" the commission and put employers on notice
that in Colorado fair employment is more than just a mere statement
of policy.
State legislation, in the area of fair employment, has not been
the subject of much litigation; certainly not to the extent found
in the area of fair housing. Perhaps this is because most respondents
do not wish to engage in a legal challenge of the commission
and/or the complainant's allegations. This may be for several
reasons, not the least of which are the cost, and the fact that adverse
publicity is bad for business. Generally, employers prefer to explore
the conciliation process and settle the case amicably.
As Schroeder and Smith state in their treatise, Defacto Segre-
gation and Civil Rights,58 the only case to come before the United
States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of state fair employment
laws is Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi,5" which held the New York
law valid. The Court ruled that there is "no constitutional basis
for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion
solely on the basis of race, color, or creed by an organization, func-
tioning under the protection of the state which holds itself out to
represent the general business needs of its employees.''60 On the
basis of this case, Schroeder and Smith have suggested that these
fair employment practice laws are a valid exercise of state's police
powers.6
While not dealing specifically with fair employment laws, there
are some cases of interest which relate to discrimination in employ-
ment. These cases are class actions brought by Negroes against
unions, employers, and governmental entities to invoke the injunctive
powers of the courts to prohibit any continuance of a discriminatory
pattern in employment and union membership.
One such decision is the case of Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship
Comm'n12 where a suit was brought by three Negroes against a
labor union, its joint apprenticeship committee, a steel company, a
580. SCHROEDER & D. SMITH, DEFACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 228 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as SCHROEDER).
59326 U.S. 88 (1945).
60Id. at 94.
61 SCHROEDER, supra note 57, at 229-30.
62223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963).
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construction company, the United States General Services Adminis-
tration, the United States Department of Labor and a local board
of education. The court found that the plaintiffs were not admitted
to the apprenticeship training program, were then refused member-
ship in the union, and therefore not able to obtain a job on a federal
construction project solely on the basis of their race and that there
was no other remedy open to them to obtain relief. Interestingly
enough, the defendants' counsel admitted the plaintiffs had a just
grievance but alleged there was simply no remedy to their complaint.
In response, Judge Campbell invoked the equitable doctrine "ubi Jus
ibi reinedium" - where there is a right there should be a remedy.6"
While not citing any cases dealing directly with the issues before
the court, the judge proceeded under the broad mandates of the
fifth and 14th amendments of the Constitution and related cases,64
and held that the plaintiffs were clearly being deprived of their
constitutional rights.65 Accordingly, the court ordered the various
defendants respectively to train the plaintiffs, admit them to mem-
bership, and employ them.66
Subsequently, the court of appeals stated that it could not
consider the validity of the district court's findings as the case had
by then become moot since the construction for which the plaintiffs
sought employment had been completed and there was no longer
a viable issue before the court. Judgment was therefore vacated
because of mootness and the appeal dismissed.
67
In Ethridge v. Rhodes,6" which, although very similar to Todd,
does not cite the Todd decision, the judge foresaw the problem of
a moot remedy and actually enjoined further construction on a state
building until the plaintiffs were employed. The Negro complainants
were denied a job by the contractor because they were not members
of the union. On every occasion when they attempted to join the
union the officials were conveniently "out" and "unavailable." The
court found a clear pattern of discrimination because of race and
further determined that no real remedy existed elsewhere for the
complainants, in spite of the fact that there was a state fair employ-
ment practice law in Ohio6" very similar to the law in Colorado.
63d. at 19.
64 Id. at 20, wherein the Court quoted from the Continental Air Lines case, supra, then
before the Supreme Court, and adopted the Court's statement that any law which
denied applicants a job would be invalid under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment.
65 Id. at 22.
66 Id. at 23.
67 Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm'n, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
68 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
69 Oiio REV. CODE § 4112.02 as amended (Anderson 1959).
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The court ruled that the state "displayed a shocking lack of concern
over the realities of the whole situation and the inevitable discrimi-
nation that will result from entering into and performing under
the proposed contracts with the proposed contractors. '7, The court
thereupon issued an injunction against the State of Ohio enjoining
it from entering into or performing any contracts for the construction
of the subject building and the employment of any individuals for
such construction until the state, the contractor, and the labor union
could show that the labor force was secured on a nondiscriminatory
basis.
7 1
The court was perhaps on somewhat stronger ground in
Ethridge than in Todd in that in Ethridge a state was, under color
of state law and state authority, contributing to discriminatory con-
duct and was therefore clearly in violation of the equal protection
clause of the 14th amendment.
One of the most significant points about these cases is that
the courts have assumed a responsibility which they believe the other
branches of government have abrogated, or have been unable or
unwilling to assume. These decisions go beyond a mere statement
of a policy of the law and require the state and/or Federal Govern-
ment to engage in affirmative action to correct the abuses inherent
in a discriminatory pattern and insure that the pattern is eliminated.
In addition, of course, the courts also make the point that public
funds cannot constitutionally be used in any manner which follows
or perpetuates a pattern of discrimination and Ethridge implies that
these sums must be withheld until such discrimination ceases.72
Both of these decisions, but particularly the Ethridge decision,
indicate that an alternative remedy may be available in Colorado
in a civil rights matter by alleging a violation of basic constitutional
rights. This alternative remedy appears to be available whether
or not the jurisdiction of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
has been invoked by filing a complaint.
Shortly after the Ethridge decision, Ohio amended its law to
void exclusive hiring agreements between a public works con :ractor
and a union unless the union includes procedures for referring
qualified employees without regard to race, color, religion, national
origin, or ancestry.7" Also, the Ohio Governor issued a new Execu-
tive order prohibiting the waiving of a nondiscrimination clause
in public works contracts and requiring all public works contractors
70Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
71 Id. at 89.
72 Id.
73 OHio REv. CODE §§ 153.581, 153.591 (Anderson 1967).
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to obtain their labor forces from nondiscriminatory sources.74 This
Executive order, however, does not provide for the cancellation
of a state contract where discrimination has occurred, which cancel-
lation provision is the heart of Colorado Governor John A. Love's
Executive Order of April 15, 1968."
Probably more than any other type of civil rights statute, fair
employment practice laws illustrate one of the basic problems with
the form of the civil rights statutes being administered by the states
today. The Green case is an example. It took Green seven years to
obtain the job he should have been entitled to at the outset. If a
commission finds for the complainant and orders affirmative relief,
the commission will have succeeded only in providing a remedy
for a single act of discrimination as it affects one person. Obviously
this is chipping away at the problem and does little to remedy the
basic prejudice which was manifested in the act of discrimination.
Also, in approaching the problem on a case-by-case basis, the law
is subject to abuses by both the complainant and the respondent.-6
It allows for the filing of questionable charges by a complainant
and provides a procedure for a respondent to protract the awarding
of relief to a complainant who cannot afford to wait.17
It is clear that the experiences of a decade or more have shown
that the case-by-case approach utilized by the commission structure
is not serving the purpose for which it was created. It is at the most
a deterrent from continuing with a previous pattern of behavior.
Something else is needed to not only require a halt to discriminatory
actions but, beyond that, to change or alter the direction or pattern
of the wrongful conduct. Perhaps the present type of enforcement
should be retained as a last resort to force a discontinuance of
unlawful actions, but only as a final step after some form of affirm-
ative action encouraging voluntary action to benefit many individuals
has first been attempted and has failed. It is this alternate method
or type of approach which should be explored in detail as an adjunct
74 Executive Order, Gov. James A. Rhodes, June 5, 1967, at 6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES 451:951 (1967).
75 Executive orders are of dubious value, but if you do have one it is best to have a
good one. It is submitted that without some enforcement provisions (such as cancel-
lation of a state contract upon a violation) executive orders are mere proclamations
or statements of policy and have a nice sound but beyond that are of little meaning
or importance.
78 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DOOSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES, at 1957-65 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
77 One of the major criticisms which was leveled at the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion in a recent survey was the delay involved in the handling of a case (a delay
which is in many respects unavoidable because of the requirements of the statute
and the delay inherent in the commission-type approach to civil rights laws). Com-
ment, Investigation Procedures of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 40 U. OF
COLO. L REV. 115 (1967).
VOL. 46
CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO
to the system now employed- or possibly even to replace the
present system.
III. FAIR HOUSING LAWS
Fair housing laws are relatively new as far as civil rights
statutes are concerned - particularly in the area of private housing.
The first contemporary fair housing statutes were limited to public
housing and it was not until the late 1950's that legislation appeared
affecting private housing and limiting a home owner in discrimi-
nating in the sale of his own property.
7 8
Colorado, in 1959, was one of the first states to adopt a fair
housing law which had jurisdiction over the sale of private prop-
erty.79 It was one of the most comprehensive laws in the country
and, with several major amendments in 1965,"0 it is now considered
to be the strongest such law administered by any state. One of the
first cases filed with the commission under the Colorado act, Colo-
rado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case,81 established the con-
stitutionality of the law and also pointed the way for subsequent
amendments in 1965. In a 6 to 1 opinion, Justice 0. Otto Moore
of the Colorado Supreme Court wrote that the Colorado Legislature
had accepted the challenge of the "forgotten Ninth Amendment" '
and that:
When, as at present, the entire world is engulfed in a struggle to
determine whether the American concept of freedom with equality
of opportunity shall survive; when tyrannical dictators arrayed
against this nation in the struggle proclaim throughout the world,
with some justification, that we do not practice what we preach,
and that "equality of opportunity" is a sham and a pretense, a
hollow shell without substance in this nation; we would be blind to
stark realities if we should hold that the public safety and the
welfare of this nation were not being protected by the Act in
question. Indeed, whether the struggle is won or lost might well
depend upon the ability of our people to attain the objectives which
the Act in question is designed to serve. 83
However, the court in the Case decision found that a portion
of the law was unconstitutional. That section which allowed the
commission to enter an order requiring a respondent to take "such
other action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate
the purposes of this article ' 8 4 was an unlawful delegation of
78 2 EMERSON, supra note 76, at 2050.
79 Colorado Fair Housing Act of 1959, Colo. Sess. Laws of 1959, at 489.
80 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-2 et seq. (Supp. 1965).
81 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962).
8Id. at 247-48, 380 P.2d at 41.
8 Id. at 248, 380 P.2d at 42.
84 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1960).
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authority and improperly gave the commission "carte blanche"
authority to do as it saw fit.85
Various attempts were then made to define the commission's
authority and in 1965 the law was substantially amended giving the
commission authority to invoke the injunctive powers of the district
court." The law as presently written prohibits discrimination against
persons because of their race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or
ancestry in the:
(1) a. refusal to show, rent, sell, lease, or transfer housing,
or to transmit a bona fide offer to buy, sell, rent or
lease housing,
b. denial of the terms, conditions, or privileges relating
to housing,
c. refusal to furnish any facilities or services in connec-
tion with such housing,
d. making of any written or oral inquiry or record
which is discriminatory of a person seeking to pur-
chase, rent, or lease housing.87
(2) a. making of any written or oral inquiry which is dis-
criminatory of an applicant for financial assistance
for the purchase, construction, or repair of housing,
b. discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges
relating to the obtaining of financial assistance for
housing.88
(3) a. utilizing or respecting of any discriminatory retric-
tive covenants.89
(4) a. discrimination in the advertising of housing for sale,
transfer, rental, or lease.9 °
(5) a. aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing
another to commit any unlawful housing or dis-
criminatory practice,
b. obstruction of any person from compliance with the
Act or attempting to commit directly or indirectly,
a discriminatory practice.9'
8 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 250, 380 P.2d 34, 43
(1962).
86 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965).
871d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,b) (Supp. 1965).
88 1d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,c) (1963).
89 1d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,d) (Supp. 1965).
90Id. § 69-7-5(1)(a,e) (Supp. 1965).
9 1 1d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,f) (1963).
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(6) a. discrimination against any employee or agent for
obedience to the Act in matters of compensation,
discharge, or demotion. 2
All property publicly advertised for sale, lease, or rent is
covered by the act with the only exception being the "Mrs. Murphy's
boarding house" situation where a single family home is occupied
by an owner or lessee as a household and rooms are offered for
lease or rental. 3 No logical reason exists for this exception and
anyone interpreting it should take as restrictive a view as possible.
The commission will adopt such restrictive position in handling
a case involving this factor and presumably a court will also, since
no public policy or benefit is served by such a limitation; and as
the police power of the state has been invoked by the passage of
such legislation, the provision should be strictly construed as being
contrary to the general purpose and policy of the statute which
was enacted to prohibit discrimination. Regardless of whatever
motives may have prompted the legislature to create such an
exception, it should be removed from the statute because such
anomolies cannot stand the test of an independent evaluation and
serve only to detract from the law as a whole while performing
no purpose whatsoever when read in the context of the entire
statute.
The law makes no distinction between private homes offered
for sale or rent by the owner himself or through a realtor; it
means any real property, including vacant land and commercial
space.94 However, other limitations are an exclusion of nonprofit,
fraternal, educational or social organizations or clubs,95 and an
allowance for religious or denominational institutions to give pref-
erence in housing to persons of the same religion or denomination.9
In addition, there is a permissive clause for leasing premises to
members of only one sex.1
7
As will be subsequently discussed, the statute sets forth a
procedure to be followed in the processing of a complaint before
the commission.9 8 This is inherently a time consuming process and
allows for a respondent to dispose of the property or otherwise
make it unavailable to the complainant by the time of a hearing.
92 1d. § 69-7-5 (1)(a,g) (Supp. 1965).
93
1d. § 69-7-3(1)(d) (1963).
94 rd. § 69-7-5(1)(a,b) (Supp. 1965).
95 Id. § 69-7-3(1)(c) (Supp. 1965).
-ld. § 69-7-5(2) (1963).
97 Id. § 69-7-5(3) (1963).
98 1d. § 69-7-6 (1963).
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One of the decided advantages of the Colorado law is that portion
of the 1965 amendment which gives the commission the authority
to seek an injunction from the district court holding the house in
status quo until the complaint can be heard by the commission."'
The injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is used by the
commission only when it finds some evidence that the respondent
is attempting to make the housing in question unavailable by trans-
ferring ownership or possession to a third party. Generally speaking,
this becomes immediately evident to the commission's investigator
and if an injunction is thought necessary by the commission coordi-
nator he requests the assistant attorney general to commence injunc-
tive proceedings within one or two days after a complaint has been
filed and investigation initiated.
Because of the procedural requirements of the act, the com-
mission must meet several prerequisites before an injunction can be
obtained. There must be a preliminary investigation, a finding of
probable cause, and a failure to settle the complaint by conference,
conciliation or persuasion. 100 Also, the commission generally serves
the respondent with a "Notice to Answer" either prior to the in-
junction proceedings or at the time of the service of the notice of
the setting for the preliminary injunction.
Since only the Civil Rights Commission can find whether a
discriminatory act has occurred, 10 it is not the function of the court
at the injunction hearing to try the issues raised in the complaint
alleging discrimination. The only question for the district court to
consider on the commission's motion for a preliminary injunction is
whether there are sufficient grounds for the granting of the in-
junction, e.g., irreparable harm, injury or loss, and no other adequate
remedy at law. Since real property is by definition sui generis under
the common law, it is only necessary to show to the court that the
respondent is attempting to dispose of the property to another person
in order to show irreparable harm, injury, or loss to the complainant
because that particular parcel of property would then be unavailable
to the complainant. This is a special, statutory remedy authorizing the
commission to take action, on behalf of another, to obtain injunctive
relief agaist a third party.
The complainant must, of course, put up a bond as security
for damages to the respondent if he is not successful in eventually
showing at a hearing before the commission that a violation of the
99Id. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965).
100Id. § 69-7-6(6)(a) (Supp. 1965).
l1Id. § 69-7-6(6)(a,b) (Supp. 1965).
102Id. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965).
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act has occurred.' 0 2 The act provides for an initial preliminary in-
junction for 60 days with an extension for another 60 days if
necessary. 
10 3
Since the power of injunction was added to the act, approx-
imately 230 housing cases have been filed with the commission.
10 4
It has only been necessary to file for and obtain an injunction in eight
of these cases.' 0 5 The mere fact of the existence of the injunctive
powers of the commission is usually the only deterrent needed to
prevent a respondent from attempting to dispose of the property.
Should a respondent manage to dispose of the property to a
bona fide third party (i.e., no injunction has been obtained), and
a hearing has been held before the commission and a violation of
the act found, but the respondent has failed to comply with the
orders of the commission, a complainant may file a civil action
against the respondent. The complainant can then recover his actual
damages, interest, and costs from the respondent, and the court may
further order similar housing made available to the complainant
if the circumstances warrant.' This provision is of little value
as a deterrent as it does not provide for exemplary damages. Also,
if similar housing were not available from the respondent at the
time of the commission hearing, the only order the commission
could issue under the Case decision would be a cease and desist order
against the respondent and the complainant would then have to prove
a violation of that order before he could initiate a civil action in court.
Violation of the commission's cease and desist order would be
for all practical purposes, impossible to prove, as the plaintiff would
have to show subsequent acts of discrimination related to the initial
charges filed with the commission. 0 7
Following a hearing, if the commission finds that an act of
discrimination has occurred, it can enter an order requiring the
respondent to sell, transfer, rent, or lease the housing to the com-
plainant; to cease and desist from further acts of discrimination;
or to grant financial assistance or to rehire and compensate an
employee who has been discharged because of compliance with
the act. l ' The specific remedy to be applied will depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case.
In addition to Colorado, fair housing laws have been found to
1°3Id. § 69-7-6(6)(e) '(Supp. 1965).
104 COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, A TIME FOR CHANGE AND CHALLENGE -
CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO 1966-1968.
1051d.
106 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-8 (Supp. 1965).
107Id.
108Id. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1965).
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be constitutional in five other states: California, 09 Connecticut,"'
Massachusetts,"' New Jersey,"' and New York." 3 Of these, all
but the California decision related to fair housing laws covering
private housing. California's case is applicable only to publicly-
assisted housing. A Washington case holding the opposite is O'Meara
v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination," 4 which held
that the law unconstitutionally classified housing by banning dis-
crimination in publicly-assisted housing while not including private
housing. The O'Meara decision was specifically considered and re-
jected in California'" and a previous New Jersey case."'
To date, 23 states have adopted fair housing statutes in various
forms." 7 In addition, Congress has recently passed a federal fair
housing statute." 8 The federal law, although not as broad as the
Colorado statute, does cover all housing except private homes sold
through a realtor." 9 One of its weaknesses is lack of adequate
enforcement powers. The only real affirmative remedy provides
that an aggrieved person may file a civil suit to make the housing
available, and/or for damages ;120 but there is no specific provision
prohibiting the defendant from making the housing unavailable
while the case is being prosecuted, and the administrative procedures
required before a civil suit can be entertained will inevitably take
a considerable period of time. If he can, the plaintiff will have to
seek an early injunction in the district court if he is serious about
having the property in question or it will surely become unavailable
by the time he can obtain a court order requiring that it be made
available to him and he will then only be entitled to damages. As
far as Colorado is concerned, however, the federal law will have
09Burkes v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1962 ).
"1 Swanson v. Commission on Civil Rights, No. 94802 (Sup. Ct. New Haven Co.,
Conn. July 11, 1961).
1i Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 182
N.E.2d 595 (1962).
"1
2 David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965).
113 Cooney v. Katsen, 41 Misc. 2d 236, 245 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
14 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
1
5 Burkes v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 470, 316 P.2d 313, 320, 20 Cal. Rptr.
609, 616 (1962).
116 Jones v. Haridor Realty Co., 37 N.J. 384, 394, 181 A.2d 481, 486 (1962).
117 See EMERSON, supra note 76, at 2058. Note that this source only refers to 19 states.
Subsequently, the following states have adopted housing statutes: Hawaii, Session
Laws of Hawaii, 1967, Act 193, at 194; Iowa, IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 105 A.2, 105
A.9 (Supp. 1969); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 21 et seq. (1968);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1452 (Supp. 1968). EMERSON also includes a
rather comprehensive list of other authorities on the general subject of fair housing.
118 Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. 1969).
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little, if any, effect since the Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment will defer to the state because Colorado has a law which
is "substantially equivalent" to the federal act.12'
Considering their relatively recent appearance on the scene,
fair housing laws seem to have generated more litigation than any
other type of civil rights statute. The adoption of this type of statute
is frequently bitterly opposed and such opposition is generally spear-
headed by representatives of the real estate profession. In Colorado
this was quite evident in 1959 when the state's fair housing act was
before the general assembly. However, experience with fair housing
has demonstrated to the real estate profession the desirable effects
of a statewide prohibition against discrimination. The imagined fears
of integrated housing have not materialized (e.g., reduction in prop-
erty values in areas where integrated housing occurs and a vitiation
of real property rights). There has been a general reversal of at-
titude by the building and real estate industry in Colorado to the
point where in 1965, when the fair housing act was again before
the general assembly for amendment, the Colorado real estate and
building industry generally supported the concept of fair housing.
This was evidenced by the adoption by CAREB (Colorado Associ-
ation of Real Estate Boards) on October 10, 1964, of a resolution
endorsing fair housing, and rejecting any discriminatory practices
by its members. 12 2 This is not to say that discrimination does not
exist in the profession, but it does demonstrate that responsible
members of that group have seen the validity and benefit of such
a law.
Other states, such as California, have experienced a different
response. In that state, Proposition 14 was adopted by popular initia-
tive to amend the state constitution.' 23 This amendment prohibited
the state legislature from interfering with a property owner's ab-
solute discretion to sell, rent, or lease his property as he saw fit.
The amendment to the state constitution was a direct assault against
the Rumford Act, 124 California's fair housing statute. Following
the passing of Proposition 14, the amendment was challenged. Both
the California Supreme Court2'2 and the United States Supreme
Court 1 26 held that such a provision in a state constitution was a
violation of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution
1ild. § 3610(c-d).
122 Resolution on file in office of Colorado Association of Real Estate Boards, Denver,
Colorado.
"'CAL. CONST. art 1, § 26 (1964).
124 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 35700-35744 (1962).
125 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
126 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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in that it was an attempt, by state action, to deny a segment of the
citizens of the State of California equal protection of the state's
laws. In effect, it was a constitutionally guaranteed license to dis-
criminate.
Civil rights and a charge of discrimination generally cause a
visceral reaction in people who are brought into contact with the
issue through a civil rights complaint. In such cases, the response is
almost totally emotional. In the experience of the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, this kind of reaction occurs to a far greater
extent in housing cases filed with the commission than in any other
type of case. It would seem that while some persons may not have
a strong objection to working or eating next to a Negro, for example,
the thought of actually living next to one as a neighbor is unac-
ceptable."' This attitude is, of course, contrary to our philosophy
of basic equality. Our system, as evidenced by the laws under which
we live, means equal opportunities, advantages, and privileges for
all and that the only limitations that a person should face are those
of himself as an individual.
This precept is reflected in a case recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Com-
pany," 8 suit was brought against the defendant home builder be-
cause of its refusal to sell a subdivision home to them because they
are Negroes. The defendant was a private builder operating without
the benefit of any state or federal funds. The suit claimed that this
discrimination was unconstitutional and asked for special and
exemplary damages and/or a mandatory injunction. The federal
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim for which
relief could be granted.1' 9 The court of appeals upheld the district
court's action but at the same time noted constitutional justification
for holding that the action of respondents constituted prohibited
racial discrimination but felt itself bound by past Supreme Court
decisions.'30 While a portion of the plaintiffs' case rested upon exist-
ing federal statutes, the plaintiffs also raised fundamental constitu-
tional questions regarding the action of the defendant in refusing to
sell to them because of their race. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1866,131 under which the case was filed
and which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
real property was valid and constitutional under the provisions of the
13th amendment. Every citizen may buy or rent real property under
127 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1942).
128 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
129 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
130 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
13142 U.S.C. § 1982 (1866).
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the law without limitation by the offeror because of the race of that
citizen.
The decision does not conflict with the pertinent provisions of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act,' as this new law, if anything, supple-
ments the earlier statute by more carefully defining the manner in
which Congress wishes to implement the 13th amendment.
Therefore, by federal statute, and by the Jones decision, fair
housing has become the law of the land, but, as previously stated,
it establishes a standard already set in Colorado. However, setting
a standard does not solve the problem, it only serves to identify the
problem and announce that one actually exists. The real work of
its elimination is then only just beginning.
IV. PROCEDURE.
The final portion of this article is an explanation of how the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission administers the law and the
procedures established for the handling of a case.
Under the three statutes previously discussed, any person who
feels that he has been discriminated against may file a complaint.
83
The commission does not have discretion to refuse to accept a
complaint unless jurisdiction is clearly absent (e.g,, a complaint
against the Federal Government or in an area outside of employment,
housing or public accommodations). In addition to an aggrieved
person, a complaint may also be filed by a commissioner, the com-
mission, or the attorney general.3 The various statutes require
that a complaint must be filed within a specified period of time fol-
lowing the date the alleged act of discrimination occurred or the
statutory right will lapse. These time limitations are as follows:
(1) Employment ....................... 6 months.
13 5
(2) Housing ............................ 90 days. 1'
(3) Public Accommodations ............... 60 days. 13 7
Immediately upon filing, the case is assigned to a commission
civil rights specialist who conducts an investigation of the charges
of discrimination. Under commission rules of practice and procedure,
the respondent must receive a copy of the complaint within 20 days
of filing with the commission. Service may either be accomplished
13
2 P.L. 90.284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
1




COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 2F(3), at
6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
1 35 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-7(15) (1963).
136 d. § 69-7-6(15).
137 1d. § 69-7-6.
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by the investigator personally or by certified mail.1' Amendments
may be, and frequently are, made to the complaint upon information
gathered during the investigation.'89
It must be emphasized that at this stage of the proceedings, the
commission staff is only attempting to determine the position of
the respondent with respect to the charges of discrimination made
by the complainant. In effect, the staff is only interested in getting
the other side of the story, which the staff is required to do by
law once a complaint has been filed. 4 ' If any difficulties are en-
countered by the staff in conducting their investigation, they will
utilize subpoenas duces tecum and depositions to obtain the infor-
mation thought to be necessary to properly investigate the case.
These procedures are available throughout the handling of the
case including, of course, the preparation of the case for a hearing.
Once the preliminary investigation is completed, the report of
the investigator is prepared and submitted to the coordinator (di-
rector) of the commission for an evaluation. The coordinator will
determine whether or not in his opinion "probable cause" exists
to credit the allegations of discrimination made in the complaint.'
If he finds no probable cause, the case is summarily dismissed and
the proceedings are terminated. If probable cause is found, the com-
mission will continue with the case and attempt to resolve the issues
amicably by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.' 42
The concept of probable cause has proved difficult for some
persons to understand. Since the commission must accept all cases
that are filed except those which can be summarily rejected for lack
of jurisdiction, some procedure must be established to weed out
cases which are clearly spurious or which do not contain the needed
element of discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, national
origin, or ancestry. Examples would be where the inevstigation
reveals that the actions of the respondent were entirely justified or
obviously were not motivated by discriminatory reasons, (i.e., em-
ployment cases where the complainant was denied a job for clearly
being unqualified for the position, or in housing cases where an
applicant did not meet the requirements of the landlord, e.g., having
children where children were not allowed). Various attempts have
1
3 8
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 2F(3),
at 6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
139 Id. Rule 2G.
1
4 0
CoLo. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 3(A), at
6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:186(a) (1967).
141 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7(3) (1963); Id. § 69-7-6(3) (Supp.
1965).
1
'4COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7(3) (1963); Id. § 69-7-6(3) (Supp.
1965).
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been made to define probable cause, including an attempt by the
Colorado legislature in the Fair Housing Act. 4 '
The only case found which specifically defines probable cause
as the same as set forth in a civil rights statute is Barnes v.
Goldberg,'44 where a New York Supreme Court quoting an earlier
decision stated: "Probable cause exists when there is reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
the law is being violated .... 145 This was a housing situation, but
the application would apply in any civil rights case requiring an
administrative finding of probable cause. The authority quoted in
the Barnes case was another New York decision which dealt with
an entirely different matter- the probable cause which must be
found by a magistrate for the issuance of a search warrant.146 It is
submitted that this test is far too restrictive and will encourage the
finder of probable cause to be too critical of his evidence and cause
him to require that the quantum of evidence to make such a finding
be too high.
The problems encountered in proving a case of discrimination
are difficult enough, and it is too much to expect that every case
in which probable cause is found will proceed to a public hearing.
The official who makes this finding of probable cause cannot use
as his criteria whether the case would stand up to the level of proof
required at a hearing. If he did, very few cases would be accepted
and he cannot be that demanding for the additional reason that before
a case proceeds to a hearing generally further investigation is con-
ducted. Therefore, he is really in no position to judge the case on
its hearing merits at that point.
Generally speaking, any evidence which indicates a discrim-
inatory motive for the respondent's conduct should be enough to
1
43 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-3 (1)(k) (Supp. 1965):
Probable cause shall exist if upon all the facts and circumstances a per-
son of reasonable prudence and caution would be warranted in a belief that
the transction would have proceeded to completion except that an unfair
housing practice of refusal to sell, transfer, rent, or lease had been com-
mitted. As to all other unfair housing practices, probable cause shall exist
if upon all the facts and circumstances a person of reasonable prudence and
caution would be warranted in a belief that an unfair housing practice
has been committed.
This definition reflects the trepidation of the Legislature in its attempt to
explain probably cause. Since the first sentence defines probable cause as it relates
to a refusal to "sell, transfer, rent, or lease," it covers most of the acts set forth
elsewhere as unfair housing practices. The only unlawful practice not covered is a
refusal to show, so, presumably, this is the unlawful act covered by the second
sentence as it is the only act left, although the second definition is supposed to refer
to all other unfair housing practices.
144 54 Misc. 2d 676, 283 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
145
Id. at 352.
148 People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 191 N.E.2d 798, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1963).
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satisfy the official that probable cause exists. What is evidence is
another question. A pattern may appear in the investigation not
related to the case at all, such as an insignificant or negligible per-
centage of minority people employed at a plant and those few who
are employed occupying positions of menial work or as laborers.
In such a case, if there is a complete absence of evidence pointing to
discrimination against the particular complainant and an acceptable
reason for the action of the respondent, it is hard to see how the
official can justify a finding of probable cause on such evidence
alone. In another circumstance, such a pattern of employment may
give considerable weight to an otherwise relatively weak case. Evi-
dence as used in this context therefore, means evidence directly
related to the case in point before the official. There are some good
reasons for suggesting that even a scintilla of evidence should be
sufficient for a finding of probable cause. One of the most frequent
criticisms leveled against civil rights commissions is that they dismiss
far too many cases for a failure to find probable cause.147 Pro-
ceeding with the case wherever possible gives the commission the
opportunity to obtain some affirmative relief for the complainant
by conciliation. If the finding is unsubstantiated, the respondent can
challenge it at the point of conciliation without having to defend
himself at a hearing. A case can always be dismissed at a later date
if the commission staff finds the case is deficient for a hearing.
Furthermore, since one of the Colorado commission's statutory
functions is the elimination of discrimination by education, 148 the
commission performs an important educational function at con-
ciliation conferences.
The process of conciliation is misunderstood by some. It is not
an adversary proceeding, although it frequently takes that form.
It is an attempt to resolve the issue by the process of bargaining or
negotiating for a settlement. On the basis of long experience, the
commission staff has a policy of not having both the complainant
and respondent together at the same conference except in the most
unusual of circumstances. In its best form, a conciliation conference
is a quiet, deliberate study of the case, and an attempt to work
out a resolution of the issues which is acceptable to all of the
parties. At its worst, a conciliation may degenerate into personal
attacks on each other by the participants, and accusations, challenges,
and thinly veiled threats of political or legal action against the
commission, its staff, or the complainant.
The usual procedure is for the commission staff to present the
147 See SOVERN, supra note 35, at 46-47; EMERSON, supra note 76, at 11.
148 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-3, 69-7-4 (1)(f), 80-21-5(5) '(1963).
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evidence gathered in the investigation to the respondent, together
with a suggested solution of the case, and then ask for a response.
The respondent then points out what his position is and either
accepts the proposal, makes a counter proposal, or rejects any pos-
sibility of conciliation. In a successful conciliation there is usually
a withdrawal by both parties from their original position to a
mutually acceptable middle ground. In employment cases, for
example, the commission staff may not pursue the issue of back
pay but may discuss some form of reinstatement or hiring. A great
deal of the flexibility of the commission's position depends upon
the strength of the case. If the evidence of discrimination is rather
clear cut, the staff will usually take the position of obtaining for
the complainant everything he could realize if the case were taken
to a hearing and there was a ruling in favor of the complainant.
Approximately 45 percent of the cases filed with the com-
mission are dismissed because of a failure to find probable cause,
or because the case is dropped by the complainant before a finding
is made. Approximately 96 percent of the remaining cases are dis-
posed of by conciliation or conference affording some form of
affirmative relief to the complainant. Very few cases, therefore,
actually proceed all the way to a public hearing.14 0
The commission attempts to resolve as many cases as possible
by the process of conciliation or conference. If unsuccessful, how-
ever, the case can then proceed to a public hearing.'60 At the time of
the hearing, great care is taken to insure that none of the hearing
commissioners or the examiner have any prior knowledge of the
case. If there has been any prior contact or knowledge by an indi-
vidual commissioner with a particular case, that commissioner will
usually disqualify himself from sitting at a hearing. Such contact
or information may occur where a complainant wishes to appeal a
dismissal by the coordinator of his case because of a finding of no
probable cause. Such appeals are always allowed to be presented
to the commissioners; however, when one is brought before them,
they appoint a single commissioner to hear and consider the com-
plainant's argument, separate and apart from the other commis-
sioners. This appointed commissioner will then report his suggested
course of action to the other commissioners, and his suggestion is
generally followed. That commissioner then disqualifies himself
from sitting should the case eventually end in a hearing.
149 These figures were taken from a report prepared by the commission of its opera-
tions since it began functioning in its present form in 1957. This report was in-
cluded, in part, in a study conducted of the Commission and printed in Comment,
Investigation Procedures of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 40 U. OF COLO.
L. REv. 119-21 (1967).




Prior to a hearing, the commission must issue a notice to answer
requiring that the respondent file a verified answer within 10 days
of the service of the notice, or not less than five days prior to the
hearing.151 Thereafter, the commission serves the respondent with
a notice of hearing, advising him that the case has been set for
formal hearing. This notice must be served at least 15 days in
advance of the hearing. 5 ' At the public hearing, the case for the
complainant is presented by the assistant attorney general assigned
to the commission as legal counsel. The statute provides that the
commission "shall not be bound by strict rules of evidence pre-
vailing in courts of law or equity, but the right of cross-exami-
nation shall be preserved."' 53 In its rules, the commission has gone
one step further and provided that "such rules and requirements of
proof shall conform to the extent practical, with those in civil
noninjury cases in the district courts."' 54 The hearing is conducted
by either a hearing examiner appointed for that purpose or by a
commissioner or a number of commissioners. 1 There has generally
been at least one commissioner who is an attorney to act as a hearing
officer and rule on motions, the admissibility of evidence, etc. Only
commissioners or a specifically appointed hearing examiner hear
cases and the investigative staff and the coordinator do not participate
at the hearings except to give evidence through testimony as a
witness.156 Before the commencement of the hearing, either party
may move for the exclusion of witnesses.' 57
All pertinent matters relevant to the hearing are considered
in advance. No provision is made either in the rules or in the
statutes for motion practice prior to the actual hearing. The only
way a party could have a motion heard, either on substantive or
procedural grounds, would be to ask for a special hearing before
the commissioners or to take such matters up at the time the hearing
itself is convened. Except for their regular monthly meetings which
include a rather lengthy agenda, the only time commissioners meet
151 CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 69-7-6(6), 80-21-7(6) (1963). In addition,
69-7-6(8) states that the respondent shall file his answer within five days of the
hearing. Possible conflicting provisions have been resolved by commission rules
(CoLo. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 6A(3)
(1965) which state that if a respondent has answered once, his answer will be
deemed by the commission to be the respondent's answer for all purposes).
1
5 2 
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6A(3), at 6
BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
'
53 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-6(11), 80-21-7(11) (1963).
1 5 4 
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 7D(2), at
6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80.21-7(6) (1963); Id. § 69-7-6(6)(a) (Supp. 1965).
15 6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 69-7-6(7), 80-21-7(7) (1963).
1'
5 7
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 7L, at 6
BNA FMIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
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is for a hearing. Therefore, motions are generally argued at the
time of the hearing.
The hearing itself, of course, is very much an adversary pro-
ceeding. The proceedings are conducted in the same manner as a
trial before a court without a jury. The complainant's case is pre-
sented first, generally by the assistant attorney general assigned
to the commission, followed by the presentation of the case for
the respondent. Opening and closing statements, motions, objec-
tions, and the introduction of exhibits are the same as in a trial
court. The examination of witnesses is also the same; direct and
cross, followed by redirect, etc., if desired. The admissibility of
evidence both as testimony and as exhibits is somewhat more
relaxed than in a trial court, particularly since the evidence is
frequently subjective in nature. However, the degree of such relax-
ation or deviation from normal trial practice is not very great. The
commissioners or hearing examiner generally do not admit hearsay
evidence. Opinion testimony is limited and, when allowed, is only
considered and weighed on the basis of who is giving such testi-
mony and the circumstances associated with such statements and,
although admitted, may be given little or no probative value.
As with any administrative hearing, the proceedings are
recorded by a reporter and a transcript can be prepared if the case
is appealed. Either party may appeal the final decision of the
commission but must do so within 30 days of the date of the final
order.15 Orders of the commission are enforceable through the
Colorado district courts. If a respondent has not appealed, but has
refused to comply with a commission order, the decision will be
certified to the district court and an order of the court issued
requiring compliance with the commission's order.' 59
As with any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, objections
not raised at the hearing cannot be raised to the court on appeal
unless the failure to object can be attributed to extraordinary
circumstances.16 ° Under the statutes, only the Civil Rights Com-
mission can make the determination of whether an unlawful act
of discrimination has occurred and the findings of the commission
are binding on the court so long as they are supported by adequate
evidence.16" ' Based upon the evidence presented at the commission
hearing and set forth in the transcript, however, the court can
enter an order on appeal enforcing, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the commission.
162
1
58 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7, 80-21-8 (1963).
19 Id. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7(12), 80-21-8(12).
60 d. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7(4), 80-21-8(12).
161 Id. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7(6), 80-21-8(6).




Having had the benefit of 12 years of operation, we can now
look back on the manner in which the commission has been
carrying out its duties and assess its performance. It was charged
with the responsibility or objective of achieving a more favorable
climate for human relations and to come as close as possible to
eliminating discrimination in Colorado. No one could realistically
believe that, by itself, the commission will ever realize this goal.
It is in reality, a very limited attempt to realize some success in
a specifically defined area.
Nevertheless, the commission is effective in performing its
statutory duties - it has been doing its job. The question then
arises as to whether these duties should be changed, enlarged, or
expanded; and if so, how much and in what manner? Admittedly
there is work to be done, but can the commission, no matter how
it is structured or no matter what powers and authority it is given,
completely eliminate discrimination? Clearly, the answer is no.
For Colorado, something else is certainly needed. Additionally,
the problems and the types of discrimination for which the com-
mission was created in 1957 are not the same today.
This does not mean, however, that the commission should
be abandoned. Since the state has gone on record as having a
definite position on civil rights, there must be some manifestation
of that policy. The government as an entity must give some formal
recognition to its declaration, and there should exist some means
of enforcement of this policy when necessary. The present method
to enforce compliance with the statutes' objectives is through the
police powers of the state, and work should be undertaken to
improve its enabling laws to allow the commission to perform
that function more easily and more efficiently.
This still leaves unanswered the much larger question of
what else should be done. The work of the commission is after
the fact, and therefore only treats the symptoms of the disease;
it does nothing to effect a cure of the malady itself. A new
approach which deals with the situation on a different basis than
a piecemeal or case-by-case basis is necessary. The current concept
is one of reaction rather than action. The state waits for others
to initiate the process or start up the machinery and then it only
solves, or partially solves, that particular incident, having done
nothing about the reasons or causes which gave rise to the incident
initially. The concept of affirmative action, i.e., action which is
initiated by the state or Federal Government, without waiting to
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be asked to react, or being forced to, is now the byword of civil
rights and human rights dialogue.
Recognizing this, the commission has recently created a study
group of educators and lawyers to examine Colorado's civil rights
statutes and: (1) determine what should be done to the laws
under which the commission operates to allow it to more effectively
accomplish its basic purpose of administration and enforcement,
and (2) make some attempt to articulate what new approaches
can be undertaken by the State to implement an affirmative action
civil rights program. No one program will be a panacea and no
single idea will be a complete remedy, but the commission hopes
to draft a new focus or approach to the work it is doing, and
to be able to suggest a program to the state which will impart a
new direction to the manner in which civil rights or human rights
are handled in Colorado.
Periodic examination of state civil rights laws will inevitably
result in a patchwork of statutes with overlapping provisions and
troublesome omissions. The effect is also that of losing sight of
the basic purpose of such laws and whether such purpose is being
realized. Hopefully, by taking an objective look at what can be
done and what is not being done, some significant steps can be
made to achieve the ultimate goal of putting the Civil Rights
Commission out of business.
The commission study group did produce an omnibus civil
or human rights statute... which brings the present structure and
163 The proposed bill's declaration of purpose reads as follows:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the state and all persons
within it have the responsibility to act affirmatively to assure that every
individual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full
and productive life. Failure to provide such equal opportunity, whether
because of discrimination, prejudice, intolerance, indifference or inadequate
education, training, housing or health care threatens the rights, privileges
and personal dignity of all individuals and menaces the institutions and
foundations necessary for a productive, open and democratic society.
To implement this finding and declaration, in fulfillment of the
provisions of the constitution of this state concerning civil rights and in
exercise of the police power of the state to preserve and further public
welfare, health and peace, a commission shall be created in the executive
department. This commission shall have general jurisdiction and power to
develop, coordinate and execute programs designed to ensure that every
individual shall have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the eco-
nomic, cultural and intellectual life of the state, and it shall encourage and
promote the development and execution by all persons within the state of
such programs, including programs to reduce community-wide or state-wide
imbalances in employment, education or housing opportunities with respect
to certain racial, religious and ethnic groups. The commission shall elim-
inate and prevent discriminatory practices as herein provided, including
discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin in employ-
ment, public accommodations, educational institutions, public services and
real estate transactions; discrimination because of sex in employment, public
accommodations, public services and real estate transactions; and discrim-
ination because of age in employment.
Proposed bill on file at the office of The Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, Denver, Colo.
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approach of the commission up-to-date and does give it some of
the tools needed to cope with the problems of discrimination today.
This bill, or a portion of it, will be introduced for consideration
in forthcoming sessions of the Colorado General Assembly.
This omnibus bill does not attempt, nor was it so drafted,
to solve the larger problem of attacking discrimination on a broader
front. Hopefully, through the cooperation of other agencies (i.e.,
the law schools, the bar associations, or in conjunction with private
or governmental agencies), a plan or proposal can be worked out
to implement such an alternative plan of action. Without such an
approach it is difficult to see how any progress can be made. The
present laws only serve to prevent a worsening of the present
condition, and do nothing to improve or correct the situation
facing us today.
